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Traditionalism and Rationalism
in the Courts

GAIL HERIOT*

Professor Wax presents two very different ways of grappling with the
issues of the day.1 On one hand, there are those who grant a strong
presumption in favor of long-established tradition and custom, believing
that a certain wisdom born of accumulated experience usually stands
behind them—even when that wisdom is not immediately obvious to the
observer. I will call them “traditionalists.” On the other hand, there are
those who put their faith in the ability of human beings to construct new
and better practices using reason and principle as raw materials. Michael
Oakeshott called them “rationalists,” and so will I.2
Traditonalists and rationalists are, of course, types, not real individuals.
But they help explain some of the legal and policy debates of our time
and why participants in those debates often seem to be talking past each
other. The world is full of individuals who can fairly be described as
traditionalists. They share a suspicion of arguments built on abstract
principles and a belief that newfangled proposals usually work better on
paper than they do in practice. Traditionalists sometimes butt heads with
their rationalist opposites, who, in turn, are baffled by what they regard
as traditionalists’ irrational fondness for established practice. Irrationality,
however, turns out to be in the eye of the beholder. To the traditionalist,
it is the rationalist’s confidence in the superiority of his own intellect
over the collective wisdom of the ages that seems irrational.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
1. Amy Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Social Science, Social Change, and
Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059 (2005).
2. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS
AND OTHER ESSAYS 5–6 (Liberty Press 1991) (1962).
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On some issues, the gap may be unbridgeable. Indeed, same-sex
marriage might turn out to be such an issue. The bold rationalist
demands proof that a break with the traditional concept of marriage will
have some deleterious effect on society. The cautious traditionalist
demands proof that it will not. Given that neither side has the proof
being demanded of it, which of the two sides triumphs depends on which
has the burden of proof. That, in turn, depends ultimately on the forum
in which the debate occurs—an academic journal or a coffee shop, a
court of law or a general election.
This brief Comment looks at the character of some of these forums,
beginning with universities, because they are an easy case to classify and
a good contrast with institutions that are more directly concerned with
law and policymaking. Professor Wax is surely correct to regard the
modern university as among the most natural of habitats for the
rationalist and the least hospitable forum for the traditionalist. Academics
pride themselves on their ability to evaluate the world critically. It is what
they do for a living, and many do it well. But academics do not get rewarded
for being right; they are rewarded for coming up with interesting and
novel ideas—ideas that are, or purport to be, derived from scientific
inquiry and reason. It is, therefore, not in their nature to write in praise of
the customs and mores of Middle America. There is more in it for them
to argue against American middle-class traditions and beliefs or to draw
favorable attention to some previously obscure group that they rightly or
wrongly suppose to have very different traditions and beliefs—like
Margaret Mead’s Samoans of the 1920s.3 It is no wonder that Professor
Wax found a dearth of academic argument opposed to same-sex marriage.
It is hard to make a splash in the academic world by arguing that the
intuitions of the average American on this issue are wiser and more
sensible than the intuitions of the educated elite.
The vice to which rationalist thought is prone has been well discussed
by Edmund Burke, Oakeshott, and now by Wax.4 All of them suggest
that in the rationalist’s zeal to produce novel insights, he sometimes
makes progress, but just as often he finds himself mired in error.
Unprotected by the moderating influence of tradition, sometimes his
errors are egregious. There may be a good reason his new idea was
never suggested before: it may be a silly idea. Fortunately for the academic
rationalist, at least in the short run, not much turns on whether he is right
or wrong. His ideas are simply ideas, incapable of doing much harm or
3. MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
PRIMITIVE YOUTH FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION (2001) (1928).
4. See OAKESHOTT, supra note 2. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS
ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (L.G. Mitchell ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1790).

1106

HERIOT.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1105, 2005]

10/5/2005 1:45 PM

Traditionalism and Rationalism in the Courts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

good except insofar as they are persuasive. Only occasionally do novel
ideas produced by academics break out of the academy in any
meaningful way.
Contrast all this with institutions that make actual policy—especially
courts. Each day, courts make decisions that directly affect lives. Legal
disputes must be disposed of—criminal defendants found guilty or not
guilty, civil defendants found liable or not liable. A judge’s professional
merit is thus assessed in a very different way from an academic’s. When
a judge errs, his fellow judges do not smile and say that although he may
be wrong, he is nevertheless a good judge because he errs in thought
provoking ways. He is a bad judge. His errors affect real people leading real
lives in a direct and immediate way. In a more perfect world, we would
replace him with a better judge, but there is the problem of life tenure.
Judicial decisionmaking must therefore be cautious and conservative.
The high rate of serious error that is acceptable in the academy in
exchange for an occasional flash of brilliance is simply not acceptable in
court. While errors will inevitably result, it is important to at least avoid
egregious errors.
Historically, this has meant a culture of legal traditionalism in the
courts—decisionmaking driven by legal precedent. Oliver Wendell Holmes
put it well: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”5 Abstract principles like liberty and equality, no matter
how high-minded or appealing they might sound, were historically
frowned upon in legal discourse. It was the less high-minded and even
boring precedents that mattered.6 In the absence of strong political
pressure for change, which would be registered through the legislatures
and not the courts, traditionalism was the way of caution.7
5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown and Co. 1938)
(1881).
6. Courts would only entertain appeals to principle at a very modest level. In the
interest of equality, like cases must be treated alike; but only those cases that are in fact
extremely similar would be viewed as “like.”
7. De Tocqueville too noted the traditionalist bent of Anglo-American courts
when he compared them to French courts, which were then still in thrall to the
intellectual legacy of the Revolution:
The English and American lawyers investigate what has been done; the French
advocate inquires what should have been done: the former produces precedents; the
latter reasons. A French observer is surprised to hear how often an English or
an American lawyer quotes the opinions of others and how little he alludes to
his own, while the reverse occurs in France. There the most trifling litigation is
never conducted without the introduction of an entire system of ideas peculiar
to the counsel employed; and the fundamental principles of law are discussed
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One way to look at the common criticism that modern courts are
inappropriately activist—a criticism that has become more and more
persuasive in the wake of decisions like Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health 8—is to cast it in terms of an evolution among courts from
a traditionalist culture to a rationalist culture. In an earlier era, courts were
unlikely to be hospitable to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage,
since the legal tradition that marriage was a union of a man and a woman,
and not of two members of the same sex, could hardly have been clearer.
In more modern times, however, courts have become more receptive to
rationalist arguments that proceed from the abstract principles of equality
and fairness and not from the most directly on point legal precedent.9 In
essence, the burden of proof has shifted. While at one time arguments
based on legal precedent would have always carried the day in the
absence of persuasive evidence that following precedent would have
harmful consequences, today it is the arguments based on abstract
principle that hold this favored position, when, as is often the case, the
ultimate consequences of a change in the law are unknown and
unknowable.
This judicial shift is not entirely a happy turn of events. This is not
because abstract notions of equality and fairness have no place in law or
policy making. They do. And in the American constitutional system, the
shift was arguably unavoidable—or at least difficult to avoid—especially
once the Fourteenth Amendment, with its guarantees of due process and
equal protection, was adopted.10 But courts may not be as well equipped
as legislatures to avoid the worst pitfalls of rationalist decisionmaking.11

in order to obtain a rod of land by the decision of the court. This abnegation of
his own opinion and this implicit deference to the opinion of his forefathers,
which are common to the English and American lawyer, this servitude of
thought which he is obliged to profess, necessarily give him more timid habits
and more conservative inclinations in England and America than in France.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276–77 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Kopf, Inc. 1953) (1835).
8. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding Massachusetts’ failure to recognize
same-sex marriage unconstitutional).
9. See id.
10. It is hard for courts to avoid considering arguments that proceed from abstract
notions of equality when little in the way of legal tradition existed to illuminate them
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment.
11. Traditionalist decisionmaking, of course, also has its pitfalls. All through their
history, common law courts have had bouts of hypertraditionalist decisionmaking—becoming
stuck in ruts that they could not or would not attempt to escape. An example whose
holding few would defend as a policy matter today might include Baker v. Bolton,
(1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (holding that no cause of action for wrongful death exists).
Parliament intervened years later with Lord Campbell’s Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93
(Eng.). Lots of other, but more contestable, examples exist.

1108

HERIOT.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1105, 2005]

10/5/2005 1:45 PM

Traditionalism and Rationalism in the Courts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

To begin with, unlike judges who act alone or in small groups, legislators
are part of large bodies—a characteristic whose importance should not
be overlooked. To act, a majority—and sometimes a supermajority—must
be convinced of the need for the contemplated action. In a bicameral
legislature, this feat must be achieved in both houses. Thus, error resulting
from isolation or eccentricity is less likely to occur.
Moreover, legislators are answerable to voters and most retain close
contact with them to be re-elected. That should make legislators even less
likely to pursue their eccentricities or to err on account of lack of information.
On important matters, their constituents will tell them what they as
constituents know and think. And it is in the legislators’ interest to listen
carefully.
Finally, courts, when they are in their most rationalist mode,
are usually deciding issues of constitutional law. Thus, they are
employing their riskiest form of decisionmaking at the very moment
when a regrettable decision will be most difficult to fix. Legislatures,
on the other hand, are more flexible. Issues that are binary before a
constitutional tribunal—“yes” a right exists or “no” it doesn’t—can be
made multidimensional before a legislature and, hence, more likely the
subject of a satisfactory compromise. Solutions can be phased in slowly
with room for revision if necessary.

But the occasional need for a legislative bailout may not be such a terrible thing. It allowed
each institution to specialize—the courts in applying legal tradition on a day-to-day basis and
the legislatures in intermittent legal innovation. Requiring courts to perform both functions
would likely result in their doing neither well. Indeed, one could look at legislatures as the
traditionalist courts’ rationalist counterpart. Legislatures have contributed systematic criminal
codes, codes of civil procedure, evidentiary codes and probate codes to the law—all of which
can be viewed as rationalist influences on the legal culture. But viewing legislatures as
conduits by which rationalist ideas reach the law is probably a bit more accurate. The most
notable rationalist contributions to the law—including the fascinating mixture of rationalist
and traditionalist thinking that is the Uniform Commercial Code—are uniform acts and other
codifications that are cooperative efforts among law professors, judges, lawyers, and
legislators. One can thus view the legislature’s job as sifting through the many competing
suggestions for legal reform and choosing those rare gems that actually improve matters.
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What does all this mean in the context of the controversy over same-sex
marriage? I started off by suggesting that the gap between rationalists and
traditionalists may turn out to be unbridgeable. But who can say for sure
whether that is right? One thing can be said: If the gap is to be bridged,
it is very unlikely to happen in the courts. It will happen in a forum
where compromise and revision are possible. Is that the legislatures? Well,
maybe, especially if they get a little help in the coffee shops, family
dining rooms, and other gathering places where the debate always begins
and ends.
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